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‘Didi, are you Hindu?’ Politics of
Secularism in Women’s Activism in India:
Case-study of a grassroots women’s
organization in rural Uttar Pradesh∗
RADHIKA GOVINDA
University of Edinburgh
Email: rgovinda@exseed.ed.ac.uk
Abstract
In this paper I take the women’s movement as the site for unpacking some of
the strains and tensions involved in practical interpretations of secularism in
present-day India. Several sources within and outside the movement point out
that there has been a tendency to take the existence of secularism for granted, and
that the supposedly secular idioms and symbols used for mobilizing women have
been drawn from Hindu religio-cultural sources. Women from Dalit and religious
minority communities have felt alienated by this. Hindu nationalists have cleverly
appropriated these idioms and symbols to mobilize women as foot soldiers to
further religious nationalism. Through a case-study of a grassroots women’s
NGO working in Uttar Pradesh, I seek to explore how women’s organizations
may be reshaping their agendas and activism to address this issue. Specifically, I
will examine how and why the 2002 Gujarat riots affected the NGO, the ways in
which it has started working on the issue of communal harmony and engaging with
Muslims since the riots, and the challenges with which it has been confronted as
a result of its efforts. In doing so, I will show how the complexities of NGO-based
women’s activism have become intertwined with the politics of secularism.
Introduction
Secularism is a multi-vocal word: ‘what it means depends upon who
uses the word and in what context’.1 The two meanings most commonly
∗ Many thanks to Professor Geoffrey Hawthorn, Professor Patricia Jeffery, and Dr
Francesca Orsini who read and commented on previous versions of this paper, and to
Vimukt Mahila Samuh for their generous support of my fieldwork. As the author of
the paper, I alone take responsibility for the analysis presented here.
1 T. N. Madan (1993), ‘Whither Indian secularism?’, Modern Asian Studies, 27 (3),
p. 674.
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attributed to secularism in the Indian context are religious neutrality
(dharmanirpeksata) and equal treatment of all religions (sarva dharma
sama bhava).2 The first of the two meanings equates secularism with
‘universalism’, that is, with treating people as citizens or as rights
bearers, independent of their religious identity. The second equates
it with ‘pluralism’ and maintaining communal harmony, that is, a
state of affairs—real or imagined—in which ‘communal’ differences
are acknowledged and accepted, and everyone is free to practise and
profess their religion.
The first time that I felt truly compelled to ask myself about others’
and my own practical interpretation of secularism was when I met a
group of adolescent girls from caste-Hindu (Hindus of various caste
groups), Dalit3 (ex-Untouchable), and Muslim backgrounds who had
been mobilized by a grassroots women’s NGO in the small town of
Banda in the northern Indian state of Uttar Pradesh. I found myself
holding on to the ‘universalism’ interpretation of secularism, which the
girls could not relate to. ‘Didi [older sister], are you Hindu?’ they asked.
When I replied that I did not subscribe to any particular faith, and
that such things held little importance for me, one of them was quick
to observe, ‘Yes, there was another didi who had come to visit us from
Lucknow and she said the same thing as you. But she was Muslim.’4
They posed similar questions about my caste background. The girls
had been on their way to perform at a monsoon (sawan) festival where
people of different communities were to sing and dance together on
the same platform. Clearly, for these small-town adolescent girls,
their caste and religion were important markers of their identity and
inescapable aspects of their everyday life. Interestingly, they were not
at all fazed by my avowed disinterest in these categories. They had
been able to gauge my religious background even though I had not
answered their questions.
2 For the two meanings of secularism outlined above, see Rustom Bharucha (1998),
In the Name of the Secular: Contemporary Cultural Activism in India, New Delhi: Oxford
University Press.
3 The literal translation of the word ‘Dalit’ from Hindi/ Marathi to English would
be ‘the oppressed’. It is used to denote ex-Untouchables or low-castes, also known as
Scheduled Castes, in official parlance. ‘Dalit’ is a term that this grouping of people
are said to have chosen for themselves.
4 Participant observation of cultural programme organized by Vimukt Mahila
Samuh to celebrate the onset of the monsoons, 8 August 2006, Chitrakoot district,
Uttar Pradesh.
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In this paper I take the women’s movement as the site for unpacking
some of the strains and tensions involved in real-world interpretations
of secularism in present-day India. I define as the ‘women’s movement’
all the mobilizing and organizing of women intended to make some
sort of social change, which in direct and indirect ways contributes
to a change in gender relations. The women’s movement in India
is a complex and variously located process. Existing in both urban
and rural India today in a highly fragmented form, the movement
consists of a multiplicity of actors. These include independent
activists, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and autonomous
women’s groups, party-affiliated women’s organizations, government-
run initiatives, and research and documentation centres. It is perhaps
the only movement in the country that engages with issues as varied
as violence against women, social discrimination, economic self-
dependence, environment protection, political representation, and
globalization. Contentious debates rage over ideology, organizational
structure, social base, issues, and modes of action among the various
actors involved in the movement.5
Those involved in the women’s movement have always claimed that
‘secularism’ is among their guiding principles. However, no concerted
attempt has been made to clearly define the concept. Several sources
within and outside the movement today point out that there has been a
tendency to take the existence of secularism for granted. They argue
that actors in the movement have ended up adopting, even if only
inadvertently, women from dominant Hindu caste backgrounds as the
subjects of their activism. They claim that the supposedly secular
idioms and symbols used for mobilizing women have actually been
drawn from Hindu religio-cultural sources. According to them, this
5 This has led several scholars and activists to question whether it is possible to
assume the existence of an overarching women’s movement in India. See, for instance,
Vina Mazumdar and Indu Agnihotri (1995), ‘Changing terms of political discourse,
women’s movement in India 1970s–1990s’, Economic and Political Weekly, 30 (29),
pp. 186–979, or Ilina Sen (ed.) (1990), ASpaceWithin the Struggle: Women’s Participation
in People’s Movements, New Delhi: Kali for Women. Some claim that there is no single
women’s movement but rather several women’s movements in India. See, for instance,
Manisha Desai (2002), ‘Multiple mediations: the state and the women’s movements
in India’, in D. S. Meyer, Belinda Robnett and Nancy Whittier (eds), Social Movements:
Identity, Culture and the State, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 66–84. While I do
recognize that the women’s movement in India is neither homogeneous nor monolithic
in nature, I contend that the different strands of the movement are bound together
by overlapping objectives and connections, and that, therefore, for the purpose of
analysis, these strands may be examined under one rubric.
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has happened because those at the forefront of the movement belong
to dominant Hindu caste backgrounds. In their desire to mobilize the
masses of women in India, and aware of the latter’s attachment to
religious norms and practices, the movement leaders seem to have
drawn on the idioms and symbols from Hindu religio-cultural sources
with which, given their backgrounds, they are most familiar. Women
from Dalit and religious minority communities have felt alienated, if
not excluded, by this.
It has become all the more urgent to address this issue because
these idioms and symbols have been cleverly appropriated by Hindu
nationalists. They have used these idioms and symbols to mobilize
women as foot soldiers to further their agenda of religious nationalism.
The communal riots of 2002 in Gujarat were, no doubt, the worst
example of this. Scholars commenting on the women’s movement
in India (such as Flavia Agnes, Tanika Sarkar, and Susie Tharu
and Tejaswini Niranjana) have written about this issue.6 However,
few seem to have empirically explored how—if at all—women’s
organizations may be reshaping their agenda and activism to address
this issue.
In this paper, I attempt to do just that by presenting my findings from
a case-study of a grassroots women’s NGO working in Uttar Pradesh.
There is a long and significant history of women’s involvement in
various peoples’ movements (such as the land reforms movement,
the farmers’ movement, and the Chipko movement for environment
protection) in the state. However, most women’s activists working
in present-day Uttar Pradesh date the beginnings of contemporary
women’s activism in the state to somewhere around the late 1980s
and early 1990s. This is the period when Mahila Samakhya, the
countrywide, state-sponsored women’s education and empowerment
programme, was initiated. It brought together state officials, the small
number of women’s activists and organizations previously active in
urban centres like Lucknow and Allahabad in Uttar Pradesh, other
activists and NGOs from outside the state, development NGOs and
voluntary agencies which operated in the programme areas, and poor
6 F. Agnes (1995), ‘Redefining the agenda of the women’s movement within a
secular framework’, in T. Sarkar and U. Butalia (eds),Women andRight-WingMovements:
Indian Experiences, London: Zed Books, pp. 136–157; T. Sarkar (1995), ‘Woman,
community, and nation’, in Sarkar and Butalia (eds), Women and Right-WingMovements,
pp. 89–106; S. Tharu and T. Niranjana (1999), ‘Problems for a contemporary theory
of Gender’, in N. Menon (ed.), Gender and Politics in India, Delhi: Oxford University
Press, pp. 472–525.
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and marginalized rural women. Its single most important achievement
was its success in organizing large masses of rural women who had
previously never been mobilized.
In present-day Uttar Pradesh, the influence of Mahila Samakhya
is visible, in some form or another, in many of the recently formed
NGOs. A quick survey of the prominent women’s NGOs in the state
reveals that most of them are headed by women who had previously
been associated with Mahila Samakhya Uttar Pradesh.7 Many who
had first become involved in women’s activism as fieldworkers, non-
formal learners or as office assistants at the different branches of
Mahila Samakhya in the state are now working for these NGOs.
Vimukt Mahila Samuh (from here on Samuh), the NGO that I have
chosen to examine, is also a product of Mahila Samakhya. Unlike
most other NGOs in the state, Samuh is based in and operates out
of rural areas, specifically Chitrakoot and Banda districts. Apart from
Mahila Samakhya, it is the only women’s organization operating in
these districts.
Samuh was set up in 1993 with the intention of mobilizing ‘poor
and marginalized’ rural women and imparting technical skills to
contribute to their empowerment. Much of its work has been with
Dalit women, mainly Chamar8 women, training them as hand-
pump mechanics to combat water scarcity, running micro-credit
programmes to address their debt problems, and supporting cases
of violence. Since 2002, it has begun working with Muslim women
too. Samuh currently has 30 permanent employees who occupy
different positions in the organizational hierarchy as leaders/directors,
coordinators, paralegals, facilitators, fieldworkers, and caseworkers as
well as accountants, office assistants, a driver, and a guard. Apart
7 Field notes, July–August 2005, Chitrakoot.
8 ‘Chamar’ is derived from the word ‘chamarkar’, and literally means ‘a leather
worker’. The Chamars are the largest caste group among the Dalits and, under
different names and sub-castes, are found throughout most of northern and central
India. Historically associated with ‘impure’ activities such as leatherwork and the
removal of dead animals, they often work as landless agricultural and manual
labourers. Though among the lowest Untouchable castes, the Chamars are generally
recognized as being one of the most advanced in terms of their educational
achievements and the number of government jobs they manage to secure, by virtue
of the reserved quota designed for them through a policy of positive discrimination.
They are also among the most politically conscious of the Dalit castes. See Manuela
Ciotti (2006), ‘In the past we were a bit “Chamar”: education as a self-and community
engineering process in northern India’, Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute (n.s.)
12, pp. 899–916.
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from the two urban-educated, middle-class women who lead the
organization, the rest of the employees are from the local population.
I treat Samuh less as a basis for characterizing the women’s
movement than as a ‘test case’, one that I consider most likely to
surmount the criticisms that have been made against organizations
that identify themselves with the movement. Its interest lies in its
promise of success rather than in exhibiting well-rehearsed limitations
and failures associated with the women’s movement in contemporary
India. My choice of Samuh is strategic: it works in rural areas
whereas an urban bias is said to have contributed to the strains and
tensions related to secularism in the context of the contemporary
women’s movement. Even though its founder-leader has a caste-Hindu
background, its second leader is a Muslim and the staff members today
consist of caste-Hindus, Dalits, and Muslims (providing a contrast to
the criticism that the women’s movement has a ‘Hindu bias’).
In the first section of the paper, I present a brief discussion on
religion, secularism, and Hindu nationalism in relation to the women’s
movement in order to set the broad context for understanding Samuh’s
position on and engagement with secularism. In the second section, I
examine how the2002Gujarat riots affected Samuh, leading the NGO
to take cognizance of the ‘crisis of secularism’ and to start working
on the issue of communal harmony and engaging with Muslims in
southern Uttar Pradesh. I also try to analyse why it took riots in
Gujarat for the NGO to start doing so, which is perhaps the trickier
of the two questions on Samuh and the riots. To answer this question,
I delve into an investigation of how the politics of secularism in the
women’s movement is deeply intertwined with the complexities of
NGO-based activism. In the process of answering these questions,
I explore whether the NGO’s staff and leadership contributed to
promoting communalism, even if only unintentionally.
In the third section, I proceed to explore exactly how the NGO
is working on the issue of communal harmony with the group of
adolescent girls from caste-Hindu, Dalit, and Muslim backgrounds
in Banda as well as the others with whom the NGO has been engaged.
In the fourth and final section of the paper, I examine the new
challenges that have arisen as a result of the NGO’s efforts to
engage with Muslims and to promote communal harmony. Here, I
focus on the NGO’s use of the term ‘minority’ (alpasankhyak) to refer
to Muslims, how far the NGO has been influenced by the official
use of the term, and what this implies about its engagement with
Muslims. I also examine in considerable detail the question of whether
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 13 Aug 2013 IP address: 129.215.19.188
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sharing marginality can be—and really is—sufficient for the Dalits and
Muslims mobilized by Samuh to experience a sense of solidarity.
The propositions and arguments made in this paper are based on
my doctoral research on the women’s movement in India. Apart from
participant observation and documentation produced and/or collected
by the NGO, the paper draws on interviews and focus group discussions
that I conducted with the NGO staff and leadership, with women from
Samuh-supported self-help groups, and with adolescent boys and girls
mobilized by the NGO. To preserve anonymity, institutional names
have been changed and all individuals quoted are either referred to
by their broad designation within the organization or proxy names.
Religion, secularism, Hindu nationalist politics, and the
women’s movement
Secularism, in the Indian context, has been expected to serve both as
a political doctrine that guides state policy and as an ideal of multi-
religious, multicultural cohabitation. There is no state religion in India
and the state does not allow itself to be attached to and/or to favour any
one religion. Yet it is not antagonistic to religious practices and beliefs.
In fact, it has undertaken to ensure the protection of all religions:
It therefore makes a huge investment in matters of religion, unlike any
nation in the West—for example, by administering religious trusts, declaring
holidays for religious festivals, preserving the system of different personal
laws for different communities, undertaking the reform of religious law,
having secular courts interpret religious laws, and so on.9
The interpretation of the concept of secularism in India is in stark
contrast to its standard English meaning, which implies the separation
of the state and religious authority, broadly corresponding to the
domains of public and private life.
In the Indian context, the project of secularism is deeply intertwined
with the project of nationalism. Nationalism does not represent the
transcendence of religious or cultural differences but their rerouting
along the lines of majority and minority religions. Majority religions
tend be identified with the nation and therefore with secular culture,
whereas minority religions are constituted as marginal to the nation.
9 R. S. Rajan and A. D. Needham (2007), ‘Introduction’, in A. D. Needham and
R. S. Rajan (eds), The Crisis of Secularism in India, Durham: Duke University Press,
p. 20.
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In the Indian context, state policies may be framed in a more or
less neutral language but state practices have often entailed the
strengthening of a Hindu idiom. A striking instance of this ‘Hindu
bias’ is the state’s focus on reforming Hindu religious customs and
practices in the name of secularism, whereas minority communities
are considered to be outside the state’s realm of concern.
Secular Indian nationalism, as described above, must not be
equated with Hindu nationalism. Hindu nationalists have a host of
organizations, which together comprise the Sangh Parivar (family
of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh or National Volunteer Corps),
including the Bharatiya Janata Party, the Bajrang Dal, and the Vishwa
Hindu Parishad. They accuse those who support official secularism
of being ‘pseudo-secular’ and the Indian state of unduly favouring
religious minorities in the name of secularism. The Bharatiya Janata
Party, which in the 1990s managed to garner the support of a
middle-class coalition of religious Hindus and those disaffected by
excessive state intervention, has insisted that its own brand of
secularism entails ‘Justice for all, appeasement to none’.10 Yet the
primary agenda of the Hindu nationalists has been to set up a
‘Hindu’ nation. Central to their discourse has been the allegation that
Muslims, in particular, constitute a threat to the ‘Hindu community’.
Indian Muslims, specifically Muslim men, have been portrayed as
being complicit with Pakistan, militant, and sexually predatory.11
This discourse is distinctly communal—that is, overtly discriminatory
against a particular religious group, in this case, Muslims. On several
occasions, it has led to Hindu–Muslim riots.
In comparison to Hindu nationalists’ virulent communalism, secular
Indian nationalism, with its ‘Hindu bias’, is a relatively banal form
of communalism.12 While secular Indian nationalism and Hindu
nationalism cannot be conflated, worrisome continuities exist between
the two. The virulent and banal communalisms that characterize their
10 1998 Bharatiya Janata Party election manifesto, cited in Rajan and Needham,
‘Introduction’, in Needham and Rajan (eds), The Crisis, p. 16.
11 For a detailed discussion on the Hindu nationalists’ anti-Muslim discourse, refer
to Patricia Jeffery and Roger Jeffery (2006), Confronting Saffron Demography: Religion,
Fertility, and Women’s Status in India, Gurgaon: Three Essays Collective.
12 For an elaboration on banal communalism, see P. K. Datta (1999),Carving Blocks:
Communal Ideology in Early Twentieth Century Bengal, New Delhi: Oxford University
Press, and Jeffery and Jeffery, Confronting Saffron Demography. The concept of banal
communalism draws on that of banal nationalism. See Michael Billig (1995), Banal
Nationalism, London: Sage Publications.
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discourses feed one another. This is what constitutes the crux of
the ‘crisis of secularism’, which is not limited to state and politics
in India—indeed, it also affects social and cultural spheres of life,
including civil society initiatives and multi-religious and multicultural
coexistence.
My exchange with the group of adolescent girls from caste-Hindu,
Dalit, and Muslim backgrounds mobilized by Samuh also needs to be
understood in this context. The kind of reluctance that I had shown in
publicly stating my caste and religious identity is typical of those whom
Dilip Menon terms as the ‘postcolonial elite’. These elite groups have
been brought up on the Nehruvian vision of India and, in their desire to
embrace a ‘modern’ subjectivity, they wish to consider themselves free
from caste and religious markings in the public sphere.13 Such elites,
he claims, prefer to relegate practices associated with ‘traditional’
markings to the private sphere. For them, the elimination of public
expressions of caste and religion is a requirement of secularism.
According to Nivedita Menon, these elites are mostly from dominant
Hindu castes, especially upper castes.14 They can afford to claim
publicly that caste and community identities are of little consequence
for them because their identities are considered the norm and this
offers them protection against discrimination. In contrast, those
from Dalit and religious minority communities are unlikely to
make such a claim, as their caste and community identities make
them vulnerable to discrimination. The Dalits tend to be reminded
constantly of how they constitute the ‘other’ precisely because of their
ex-Untouchable and often lower class identity. Those from religious
minority communities, especially Muslims, are similarly reminded of
the ‘otherness’ that arises from their religious identity. It is often the
unconscious discrimination by the dominant Hindu castes that remind
the Dalits and the Muslims of their caste and community identities.
This is indeed a manifestation of banal communalism.
The caste and community identities that the dominant Hindu caste
elites claim are of little consequence to them, especially in public, have,
in reality, always mattered. People carry their community identities
13 See Dilip Menon (2006), ‘An inner violence: why communalism in India is about
caste’, in T. N. Srinivasan (ed.), Threats to Secularism, Delhi: Oxford University Press,
pp. 60–82.
14 For an elaboration of this argument, see Nivedita Menon (2007), ‘Living with
secularism’, in Needham and Rajan (eds), The Crisis, pp. 118–40.
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whether they want to or not, whether they have rejected them or not.15
To quote Menon:
We were always legally Hindu and Muslim and Christian, governed by Hindu
and Muslim and Christian personal laws. This is not an identity we can choose
to take on or deny—this is an identity that we bear despite ourselves, it hangs
from our names, our practices, the way we speak Indian languages.16
The girls’ reaction to my reluctance to reveal my caste and religious
background clearly reflects this.
In the remainder of this section, my focus shall be on
understanding how, in the name of secularism, the repercussions of
the overlaps between banal and virulent communalisms surfaced in
the contemporary women’s movement. Most women’s organizations
considered religion as a patriarchal construct to be ignored or, at
best, resisted or challenged. By the 1980s, however, a number of these
organizations seemed to realize that, to a large extent, women depend
on religion as a spiritual mainstay and, by and large, are unwilling to
reject religion per se. Myths, epics, and folktales were reinterpreted.
Historical forms and symbols of women’s power and resistance
were unearthed. For some women’s activists and organizations, this
consisted of recasting images of women warriors and the all-powerful
Hindu goddesses, Kali and Durga, into a feminist mould. It was hoped
that women from different classes, castes, and cultural and regional
backgrounds would be able to relate to and collectively identify with
this repertoire of myths, epics, folktales, and symbols. The underlying
motive behind this was to inculcate a feeling of ‘sisterhood’ among
women and to inspire them to join the movement.17
However, Kali, Durga, and the other symbols that the women’s
organizations employed as metaphors for the power of Indian women
were predominantly Hindu. This conscious or unconscious conflating
15 For an insightful discussion on this issue, refer to Bina Srinivasan (2007),
Negotiating Complexities: A Collection of Feminist Essays, New Delhi: Promilla and Co.
Publishers in association with Bibliophile South Asia.
16 Menon, ‘Living with secularism’, p. 136.
17 For more on the women’s movement actors’ position on religion and use of
religious symbols and idioms, see Gabriele Dietrich (1994), ‘Women and religious
identities in India after Ayodhya’, in Kamla Bhasin, Ritu Menon and N. S. Khan
(eds), Against All Odds: Essays on Women, Religion and Development from India and Pakistan,
New Delhi: Kali for Women, pp. 35–59, and Radha Kumar (1993), A History of Doing:
An Illustrated Account of Movements for Women’s Rights and Feminism in India, 1800–1990,
New Delhi: Kali for Women.
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of ‘Hindu’ with ‘Indian’ was problematic18 and was indicative of the
prevalence of banal communalism in the women’s movement. Several
scholars and activists from within and outside the movement have
been critical of it. Agnes, for example, claims that since those at
the helm of the movement were predominantly ‘urban and upper
class Hindu’, the cultural expressions with which they were most
familiar ‘surreptitiously crept’ into the movement. She contends that
their intention was ‘not to propagate Hindu ideology. But since the
movement did not have “secularism” as one of its prime objectives,
no conscious efforts were made to evolve alternate symbols. . .’19 By
this she implies that the mobilization and organization strategies
employed by the movement did not take into account the separate
religious identity of women, and that women who were not from Hindu
communities could not relate to them. Overt Hindu symbols were
clearly not ‘secular’.
The dangers of banal communalism exemplified by the use of Hindu
symbols, the way in which it was done, and the failure to engage
seriously with secularism hit home with the resurgence of the Hindu
nationalists. Accounts discussing Hindu nationalist politics in relation
to the women’s movement begin with the Shah Bano controversy.
Here, the plea of a divorced Muslim woman for alimony from her
husband was granted by the Supreme Court, based on ‘secular’
criminal laws. Shah Bano’s husband challenged the judgement,
arguing that no such payment was required under Muslim personal
law.20 The case exposed the discrepancies in the state’s interpretation
and practice of secularism. Afraid of losing Muslim votes, the Congress
government overturned the Shah Bano judgement by passing the
Muslim Women’s Act in 1986 in the name of ‘protecting’ minorities.
The Act exempted Muslim women from India’s civil laws.
Following these developments, a uniform civil code became the
issue of the moment in the Indian political scene, which further
18 Geetanjali Gangoli explains very succinctly the conflating of ‘Hindu’ and ‘Indian’
and the complications that arise as a result. See Geetanjali Gangoli (2007), Indian
Feminisms: Law, Patriarchies and Violence in India, Hampshire, England: Ashgate.
19 Agnes, ‘Redefining the agenda of the women’s movement within a secular
framework’, p. 139.
20 Four religious communities—the majority Hindu, and the minority Muslim,
Christian, and Parsi communities—have their own personal laws. Other religious
groups such as Sikh, Buddhist, Jain, Scheduled Castes, and Scheduled Tribes are
subsumed under Hindu law. See Rajeswari Sunder Rajan (2000), ‘Women between
community and state: some implications of the uniform civil code debates in India’,
Social Text, 65 (18), pp. 55–82.
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exposed the contradictions between a secular constitution and a
state that administers religious laws and is indulgent to religious
communities’ demands. More importantly, it brought out apparent
and real convergences between sections of the women’s movement
and the Hindu nationalists. Women’s groups had been pressing, since
the 1960s, for the institutionalization of a nonsexist, uniform, ‘secular’
code, in the hope that it would ensure gender-just laws for women of
all communities. They initially responded to the Shah Bano case and
the Muslim Women’s Act as being about women’s rights. However, it
was disconcerting to them that the Hindu nationalists were also using
the Shah Bano case as a rallying cry for their demand for a uniform
civil code. The Hindu nationalists’ demand was overtly communal and
covertly patriarchal. They envisaged the uniform civil code to be a
version of Hindu law and hoped thereby to secure Hindu hegemony.
They had no interest in formulating a gender-just uniform civil code
as this would alienate their male support base, especially among the
upper caste-Hindus. In spite of the stark contrast in their motivations,
the women’s groups were fearful about appearing to be on the same
side as the Hindu nationalists.21
On 6 December 1992, Hindu nationalist activists demolished the
Babri mosque in Faizabad (historically Ayodhya), Uttar Pradesh,
unleashing a spate of Hindu–Muslim riots in Bombay and elsewhere
in the country. At least 2,000 people were killed. The event marked
one of the most defining moments in the history of contemporary
India because it established the resurgence of the Hindu nationalists.
Large numbers of Hindu women actively participated in this event,
committing violence against Muslim men and women. The media first
flashed images across the country of thousands of women symbolically
21 These concerns did later result in the emergence of a number of different
positions among the women’s groups—ranging from a compulsory or egalitarian
civil code for all citizens to reforms within communities with and/or without state
intervention. Immediately after the Shah Bano controversy, however, these groups
felt that by appropriating the women’s movement’s demand for a uniform civil
code, the Hindu nationalists had taken over the very language and issues of the
movement and had used them to promote a patriarchal, anti-minority agenda. For
insightful observations on the issue of the uniform civil code and the women’s
movement, see Amrita Chhachhi (1994), ‘Identity politics, secularism and women:
a South Asian perspective’, in Zoya Hasan (ed.), Forging Identities: Gender, Communities
and the State, New Delhi: Kali for Women, pp. 74–95; Nivedita Menon (1998),
‘State/gender/community: citizenship in contemporary India’, Economic and Political
Weekly, 33 (5), p. PE310; and Rajan, ‘Women between community and state’,
pp. 55–82.
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carrying construction material for the Ram temple that was to be
built on the site of the Babri mosque. During the Bombay riots that
followed, hundreds of Hindu women made petrol bombs that their
menfolk then hurled into Muslim shanties.22
That women of one community participated in violence against
men and women of another community questioned the very premise
on which the women’s movement had constructed its demands and
identity. The movement in India had assumed that women would
remain united by their common gender identity, irrespective of
differences in their caste, class, religious, and regional backgrounds.
Scholars such as Susie Tharu and Tejaswini Niranjana claim that
in the 1980s women’s activists and organizations had vigorously
devoted themselves to drawing out ‘women’ from the abstract or
politically ‘neutral’ and universalizing category of ‘citizens’, and to
placing ‘women’ on the state and development analysts’ agenda.23
What these activists and organizations had failed to recognize was
that the category ‘women’ was in itself an abstraction, that women
have many identities and that, under different circumstances, they
may favour one or the other of their identities, at times, even over
their gender identity.
The Hindu nationalists had more success in mobilizing women than
the women’s movement. The women’s movement appeared to consider
the family a key element of patriarchal organization. It demanded
that women challenge family structures and patriarchal norms but
failed to provide them with an alternative. The Hindu nationalists, in
contrast, did not demand that women distance themselves from their
family and community contexts, to which they related and to which
they felt they belonged. In fact, the nationalists recognized the fact
that women’s ties with religion were deeply intertwined with notions of
family and community, and used this to their advantage. They cleverly
mapped the identity and honour of the ‘Hindu’ community on women.
Activism aimed at protecting such honour was not only sanctioned but
also lauded by the community, and resulted in women emerging from
the confines of domesticity as invaluable footsoldiers in the Hindu
nationalist project. The shakti (strength) of the modern Durga, a
22 These observations draw on Srilatha Batliwala and Deepa Dhanraj (2007),
‘Gender myths that instrumentalize women: a view from the Indian frontline’,
in Andrea Cornwall, Elizabeth Harrison and Ann Whitehead (eds), Feminisms in
Development: Contradictions, Contestations and Challenges, London: Zed Books, pp. 21–34.
23 See Tharu and Niranjana, ‘Problems for a contemporary theory of gender’,
pp. 472–525.
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symbol that the Hindu nationalists had allegedly appropriated from
the women’s movement, was not directed against violence against
other women. It was instead mobilized to commit violence against
Muslims—the ‘outsiders’.24
The 2002 Gujarat Hindu–Muslim riots are said to have marked the
apex of Hindu nationalist politics in the country.25 What was made
clear—even as women continued to bear the brunt of the violence—
was that women’s active participation in communal violence was not a
one-off phenomenon limited to the Bombay riots of1992. Women from
dominant Hindu castes are said to have actively aided and abetted in
the violence. The 2002 riots also offered a striking example of how,
by exploiting the accepted anti-Muslim stereotypes and building on
them, the Hindu nationalists were successful in mobilizing the Dalits.
In addition, no government has ever been as blatantly involved in
causing and aggravating a riot as it is said to have been in Gujarat.
Unlike almost all previous riots, the acts of destruction revealed
themselves to be deliberate ideological strategies. Mosques were not
simply demolished but saffron flags and statues of Hanuman (the
monkey deity worshipped by the Hindus) were planted in the rubble,
symbolizing the spatial claims of forces out to establish a Hindu
nation. The numerous NGOs in Ahmedabad are said to have been
generally unresponsive at the time the violence took place: ‘In the
most infamous example of this, Gandhi’s Sabarmati Ashram refused
to grant shelter to Muslims fleeing the wrath of angry mobs.’26 The
handful of NGOs that did show interest in the plight of the Muslims
were threatened with dire consequences by the Hindu nationalist
forces. In the immediate aftermath, it was predominantly Muslim
organizations that provided relief for the (mostly Muslim) victims.
The post-conflict relief efforts ironically furthered the religious divide
rather than mitigating it. It was only later that a large number of
24 Comparisons and contrasts of the Hindu nationalists’ and the women’s
movement’s mobilization of women are available in several of the essays in Sarkar
and Butalia (eds), Women and Right-Wing Movements.
25 The discussion that follows on how the 2002 Gujarat Hindu–Muslim riots
were markedly different from previous such riots draws mainly on Nivedita Menon
(2004), Recovering Subversion: Feminist Politics Beyond the Law, Delhi: Permanent Black;
Amrita Basu and Srimati Roy (2004), ‘Prose after Gujarat: violence, secularism and
democracy in India’, in Mushirul Hasan (ed.), Will Secular India Survive?, Gurgaon:
ImprintOne, pp. 320–55.
26 Basu and Roy, ‘Prose after Gujarat’, p. 325.
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NGOs from all over the country started converging upon Gujarat to
provide relief and to engage in reconstruction work.
Gujarat riots, the communal question, and the NGO
In the course of my interactions with them, both Samuh’s leadership
and staff repeatedly claimed that the Gujarat riots marked a turning
point for the organization. While one of the Samuh leaders, a trained
lawyer and, at the time, the NGO’s only Muslim member, began to take
a keen interest in the riot-related court cases, other members of the
organization travelled to Ahmedabad and actively involved themselves
in post-riot relief and reconstruction work.27 For the majority of
Samuh’s staff and leadership, this was their first opportunity to work
with Muslims and it proved to be, in many ways, an eye-opener for
them. Their interactions in the camps allowed them to learn about
Muslim cultural norms and practices and dispelled many of their
prejudices. They had believed Muslims to be disloyal to India, that
they tended to ignore calls for family planning, that they collected
arms, and were extremely conservative and orthodox.28 The staff and
leadership even admitted that they had taken for granted that their
activism was shaped by a secular framework, and they had assumed
that communalism did not affect their lives in any way. In the words of
one of the Samuh paralegals, who is from an upper-caste background:
It may have happened but this is about Ayodhya. It may have happened but
this is about Ahmedabad. This is not a concern for us. Where we live, such
things never happen. This is how we used to think before. . .29
Chitrakoot district, Samuh’s main area of operation, had always
been considered the hotbed of communalism in the region. Chitrakoot
town is a place of pilgrimage for devout Hindus.30 Powerful landlords
from dominant Hindu castes controlled the land and the people
working it. Leaders of Hindu nationalist outfits like the Rashtriya
27 This information is drawn from an interview with a paralegal at Samuh, 22
November 2005, Chitrakoot, and a focus group discussion with a mixed group of
Samuh staff members, 24 November 2005, Chitrakoot.
28 Here I draw on three focus group discussions that I conducted with a mixed
group of Samuh staff members, 25 August 2005, Chitrakoot.
29 Interview with a paralegal at Samuh, 22 November 2005, Chitrakoot.
30 Chitrakoot is known for having been the place where characters from Hindu
mythology, namely Lord Rama and Sita, sought refuge after they were exiled from
Ayodhya many centuries ago.
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Swayamsevak Sangh were active in the district. Mahila Samakhya, the
women’s education and empowerment programme, of which Samuh is
a product, was an Indian government initiative that worked closely
with one of the oldest social service organizations in the region.
Although not explicitly communal, this organization was—and is
still—said to have links with the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh and
the Bharatiya Janata Party.31
Speaking about her awareness of the presence of such communal
actors in the region, the Samuh founder-leader, who had previously
worked for Mahila Samakhya, and whom I quoted above, boldly
observed:
Did we not realise? We did and we didn’t. The day I found out about [the
social service organisation] feeding hundreds of people offering their services
for free for the Hindu nationalist cause [karsevaks] going to Ayodhya [for the
demolition of the Babri Masjid], I quit. This was 1992. Yet, somewhere, I
chose to overlook it. The same people I [began] working with supported the
demolition. I hadn’t realised that they felt like that because we’d never even
opened up that topic. So it was a part of us that we had just been ignoring.32
On another occasion, linking the shortcomings of her own NGO and
Mahila Samakhya to the women’s movement’s failure to adopt a
secular framework and to engage with Muslim women, she observed:
If you look at [Mahila Samakhya’s set of] training modules, it was very
focussed on gender. Somewhere the nuances of minority/majority were not
recognised. Yes, I know that Agnes had already written by that time about
how women of minority communities were being excluded by the women’s
movement but we were still not recognising these things.33
She and the paralegal quoted above were not the only ones to have
spoken about this reluctance to recognize such things in those days.
Razia, also a leader at Samuh, said that, as a Muslim, she too had felt
constantly discriminated against when she was living in Chitrakoot.
She had trouble renting a house and she was looked at with suspicion.
Even at Samuh, she felt something amiss about the fact that she was
the only Muslim member and that her organization engaged mainly
with women from a predominantly Hindu religio-cultural background.
31 This information is drawn from two interviews, the first with a male leader of
a local voluntary organization supported by the Hindu nationalists, 13 August 2005,
Chitrakoot; and the second with a male leader of a local land rights organization, 23
August 2006, Chitrakoot.
32 Interview with Samuh’s founder-leader, 18–21 September 2006, Lucknow.
33 Interview with Samuh’s founder-leader, 18–21 September 2006, Lucknow.
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However, she did not question this as she considered herself and her
organization to be guided by ‘secular’ principles.34
It was only after the Gujarat riots that things changed. Samuh
acknowledged that discrepancies had arisen between the objectives it
had set out to achieve and what it had actually achieved. To quote the
founder-leader:
What happened in Gujarat really shook us up. It made us think about
how unprepared we were if something like this were to happen in U[ttar]
P[radesh]. . . We [had been] saying that Samuh works with people on the
margins. . . From the beginning, we had said Samuh is a secular organisation.
And then we realised that. . . we weren’t fulfilling our objectives of including
all those at the ‘margins’, including the Muslims. We had mouthed something
that we hadn’t done in practice!35
From the above discussion, it is evident that Gujarat 2002 marked
a turning point for the organization, particularly for the NGO staff
and leaders’ participating in the post-riot relief and reconstruction
work. The interviews also shed light on the ability of Samuh’s team of
workers to examine themselves and their work honestly and to make
efforts to overcome their failure to be truly secular. This is especially
significant since, unlike the Gujarat-based NGOs which had similarly
failed and were therefore compelled to examine themselves and to
change, the NGOs like Samuh, working with women elsewhere in the
country and therefore not directly affected by the riots, faced no such
compulsions and, in fact, many of them had chosen to remain aloof
from these developments.
Much as I appreciate the organization’s explanation about how its
involvement in post-riot relief and reconstruction work in Gujarat
changed its perspective, and its willingness to put the new perspective
into practice, I consider that there remain gaps in this explanation,
which may not be obvious to the NGO staff and leadership. I argue
that, in addition to their ‘Hindu majoritarianism’ or failure to be
truly secular, the reasons for their engagement with the issue of
communalism and for mobilizing Muslim women only after the 2002
riots are linked with the politics of funding.
Like most NGOs, Samuh had taken up externally funded projects
to become financially stable. These projects were geared primarily
towards the provision of services ranging from livelihood support to
34 These observations are drawn from my interview with Samuh’s Muslim leader,
11 June 2005, London.
35 Interview with Samuh’s founder-leader, 18–21 September 2006, Lucknow.
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legal aid within the existing social structures, and were designed
for ‘poor and marginalized’ women. Typically, for most national and
international funding agencies, the ‘target’ marginalized groups were
usually Dalits, tribals, and women. Muslims, who were as marginalized
as the Dalits and the tribals, and who, unlike them, did not benefit
from government reservations and special development schemes did
not register as a marginalized community in the funding agencies’
scheme of things.36 For nearly nine years of its existence, Samuh too,
funded by such agencies, had mobilized, in the name of the ‘poor and
marginalized’, poor Dalit women but not poor Muslim women. In need
of funding to stay afloat, it had done so more or less unquestioningly.
Things changed in 2002. With the media’s daily coverage of
the riots and the riot-affected victims, the communal question
and the condition of Muslims became an issue for national and
international debate. A number of funding agencies—both national
and international—now began to show an interest in financing projects
that involved Muslims. NGOs genuinely interested in working with
Muslims found this an opportune shift. However, there were many
others who only showed an interest in working with Muslims because
doing so would attract funding. It is important to note, however, that
funding was mostly made available for promoting communal harmony.
The first-hand experiences of Samuh’s staff and leadership during
relief and reconstruction work in Gujarat had made them sensitive
to the need to work with Muslims in southern Uttar Pradesh. By this
time, Samuh had also established itself as an important actor in the
NGO sector in India. It was financially stable and in a position to
negotiate its own terms for accepting and even proposing projects.
It was able to secure funding from a well-known Indian trust and a
Japanese peace foundation to work with Muslims.37
However, some local and regional NGO leaders whom I interviewed
claimed that Samuh’s underlying motive for working on issues of
communal harmony and for involving Muslims in its activism was
so that its leaders would gain national and international publicity for
36 This argument is drawn from the Centre for Human Rights and Development
(2008), ‘Advocating Rights of Muslims: Problems and Challenges’, A Preliminary
Report for the CHRD, <http://www.socialjusticeindia.org/minority_rights.htm>,
[accessed 12 August 2012].
37 My observations on Samuh’s sources of—and situation with respect to—funding
are based on a focus group discussion that I conducted with a mixed group of Samuh
staff members, and from Vimukt Mahila Samuh (2005), Annual Report 2004–2005,
Chitrakoot: Vimukt Mahila Samuh.
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themselves and thereby acquire more funding and projects for the
organization. All of a sudden, national and international aid agencies
wanted to fund projects to promote communal harmony and mobilize
Muslims, and Samuh, having established itself as a ‘dependable’ NGO
and known for its good work with women in Uttar Pradesh, came to
be the beneficiary of such funding.38
I do consider that the politics of funding and Samuh’s position in
the NGO sector played an important part in facilitating its efforts to
reinvent itself by involving Muslims in its activism and by promoting
communal harmony. Further, Samuh’s work in Gujarat, especially its
leaders’ involvement in seeking justice for the riot-affected women
who had filed cases in court, did indeed draw the attention of the
media as well as that of national and international aid agencies to the
NGO. However, I do not find anything seriously wrong with any of
this as long as the NGO does keep up its commitment to work with
Muslims and on the issues of communal harmony.
NGO activism, secularism, and local culture
One of the first steps taken by Samuh’s staff and leadership upon their
return was to raise awareness about what had happened in Gujarat.
They hoped this would create a context for broaching the issue of
communalism with the local population. One of the modes it used
for raising awareness was a scroll with images (phad), depicting the
story of two girls, one Hindu, the other Muslim. The Muslim girl
suffered repeatedly in the spate of riots that broke out in Uttar Pradesh
and Gujarat, and ended up losing her belongings and family, even
experiencing physical abuse at the hands of Hindu rioters. Yet, in
the name of humanity, the Hindu girl assured the Muslim girl of her
unconditional friendship and took her in.39 The NGO staff members
had prepared the scroll, and gone from village to village displaying it
and sharing their experiences of post-riot relief work in Gujarat.
38 These observations are based on three interviews, the first with a female leader
of a women’s NGO, 24 August 2006, Chitrakoot; the second with a male leader
of a local voluntary organization mainly running self-help groups, 13 August 2005,
Chitrakoot; and the third with a male leader of another local voluntary organization,
24 August 2006, Chitrakoot.
39 I have reconstructed the story based on Vimukt Mahila Samuh (2002), Annual
Newsletter, Chitrakoot: Vimukt Mahila Samuh, and an interview with a paralegal at
Samuh, 22 November 2005, Chitrakoot.
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 13 Aug 2013 IP address: 129.215.19.188
P O L I T I C S O F S E C U L A R I S M 631
The scroll offers important insights into Samuh’s strategy for raising
awareness about communalism. That the two girls in the story were
originally from Uttar Pradesh and found themselves embroiled in the
politics of communalism that was wreaking havoc in distant Gujarat
is no insignificant detail. It reflects a conscious effort on the part
of Samuh to choose contexts and characters that the people living
in Chitrakoot and Banda could easily relate to. Further, it gives
due importance to the power of live, visual performances. This is
particularly relevant since the NGO works with mostly illiterate and
semi-literate women. Speaking about the effect of such performances
on people in the region, one of the Samuh paralegals observes:
News is one thing. But when you see people suffering in front of your own eyes,
it is soul-wrenching [atma ko jhinjhor ke rakh deta hai]. People would come up to
us and say, ‘Yes, we had heard of the riots on the radio. It used to come on
TV. But we never realised how bad it was [until we saw your performance].’40
From Samuh’s work in Gujarat emerged the understanding that
interaction among people of different communities can play a key
role in dissipating misconceptions about one another. However, there
was a paucity of common forums for such interaction in the rural
areas of southern Uttar Pradesh. Caste-, class-, religion-, and gender-
based divisions in society kept people apart. With the exception of
Razia Khan, Muslims were absent even in Samuh’s own initiatives
and staff.41 The leadership realized that it would have to put its own
house in order before reaching out to those outside.
When Samuh initially began making efforts to involve Muslim
women and to create a more inclusive work environment, its efforts
were met with resistance from several of its own staff members.42
Deep-seated communal biases harboured for years cannot be expected
to disappear overnight. However, accepting the discomfort of one’s
deepest assumptions can be a crucial step towards changing one’s
mindset. This is something that the members of the organization
seemed to have begun doing. To facilitate this process, in-house
workshops were organized by the NGO with the assistance of Delhi-
based NGOs.
40 Interview with a paralegal at Samuh, 22 November 2005, Chitrakoot.
41 The lists of Samuh employees given at the end of the annual newsletters
and reports illustrate this. See, for instance, Vimukt Mahila Samuh (2002), Annual
Newsletter, Chitrakoot: Vimukt Mahila Samuh.
42 Samuh staff members openly discussed this in a focus group discussion, 24
November 2005, Chitrakoot.
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A new branch of Samuh had been set up in Banda district in 2001
to handle the large number of cases of violence against women there.
When the NGO decided to start its work on the communal question,
the focus of the Banda branch shifted to mobilizing Muslims. Samuh’s
office was strategically located in a Muslim neighbourhood in Banda
town. The NGO staff and leadership claim that the Banda branch was
to be an experiment in working with Muslims. Today, Muslim women
have been mobilized in Chitrakoot too. Eight of Samuh’s 30 full-time
employees are Muslims.
Samuh has launched several initiatives in both Chitrakoot and
Banda, involving caste-Hindus, Dalits, and Muslims. The most
prominent among these are the Conversations Forum and Tremor
Forum. The Conversations Forum has been set up in Banda town
with the intention of bringing together adolescent girls from caste-
Hindu, Muslim, and Dalit backgrounds. The Tremor Forum, set up in
Chitrakoot district, conducts cricket and other sports tournaments
for adolescent Hindu, Muslim, and Dalit boys and girls. Samuh’s
staff and leadership do not explicitly employ the term ‘secularism’ in
their activism, and insist they are ‘just creating non-confrontational,
creative spaces for various communities to be together’.43 However, I
consider that examining such contexts/spaces as the Conversations
Forum and Tremor Forum offers interesting insights into the
organization’s rhetoric as well as practice of secularism. The very
fact that the NGO includes all the communities that it usually works
with in these initiatives suggests that it broadly defines secularism as
‘pluralism’, as a struggle against not only religious conflict but also
against class-, caste-, and gender-based discrimination.
In January and November 2005, and subsequently in November
2006, district-level cricket tournaments were organized under the
auspices of the Tremor Forum. Keen that a sense of ownership should
emerge, Samuh encouraged members of the different villages which
had teams participating to take on leadership roles in organizing the
tournaments. Samuh placed only one condition on team formation:
that it should consist of 50 per cent Hindus and 50 per cent
Muslims, and if there were not sufficient numbers of Muslims, then
43 Interview with Samuh’s founder-leader, 18–21 September 2006, Lucknow; and
focus group discussions with Samuh staff members, 24 and 25 November 2005,
Chitrakoot.
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33 per cent were to be from Dalit, Muslim, and ‘general [samanya]’44
backgrounds.45
What is of particular interest here is that in order to promote a
sense of camaraderie and solidarity, the NGO employed the discourse
of reservations; a discourse with a vocabulary and grammar already
familiar to the local population as a result of the growing politicization
of caste in local and national politics. In fact, a further look at the
other details of the conception, organization, and execution of the
tournaments reveals that, through them, Samuh was trying to put
together a cluster of symbols, idioms, and slogans that, it hoped, would
promote a respect for difference among the villagers. This reflects
that Samuh is conscious of the fact that ‘[secularism] needs to be
communicated in idioms comprehensible to people at large’, and is
employing innovative means to do so.46
Another example of the NGO’s efforts in this direction is the oath
that the players were required to take at the inauguration ceremony
of each tournament, which I have reconstructed here:
We, the people of Chitrakoot district, pledge that as citizens we believe
in ensuring that every fellow citizen living in our region has the right to
economic, social and political justice; the freedom to believe and express
his/her views; the freedom of religion and of pursuing any religion-related
work; the right to live life with equal respect and dignity; and that wherever
we live, we will struggle to establish these values.47
The oath and the language used were actually employed for a set
of expressive and instrumental purposes. The very act of the players,
who belonged to different caste and religious communities, collectively
taking the oath was intended to promote informal fellowship and
to cement their identity as a team. Further, Samuh seemed to be
trying to convey, through the wording of the oath, the importance
of recognizing difference, living tolerantly, and being aware of one’s
rights and fighting to ensure them. By insisting that the oath be taken
at every tournament, the NGO was linking the social and political
messages it wanted to convey with elements from the cultural milieu of
the rural adolescent and adult populations attending the tournaments.
44 By ‘general’ category, the NGO meant all categories of Hindu caste groups.
45 The condition for team formation was clearly stated in Vimukt Mahila Samuh
(2005), Tremor Forum tournament, flyer, Chitrakoot: Vimukt Mahila Samuh.
46 Bharucha, In the Name of the Secular, p. 100.
47 I have reconstructed the oath based on my observation of the Tremor Forum
cricket tournament supported by Samuh, 23 November 2005, Chitrakoot.
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The people of Bundelkhand region of Uttar Pradesh traditionally place
a lot of importance on oaths.
The oath also illustrates the NGO’s understanding and expectations
of the contemporary Indian state and its engagement with secularism.
A close reading of the oath brings to mind the language of secularism
in the Indian Constitution, specifically Articles 14, 15, and 29,
which guarantee equality of citizenship; and Articles 19 and 25,
which guarantee freedom of speech and expression, and freedom of
conscience and the right to freely profess, practise, and propagate
religion. While it is not part of the brief of this paper to delve too
deeply into these Articles, they are mentioned here to support the
argument that by having the wording of the oath resonate with the
language of secularism in the constitution, Samuh was trying to make
the state’s discourse on secularism accessible and meaningful for the
adolescent and mostly illiterate or semi-literate adult population of
rural Chitrakoot.
Further, by means of the carefully formulated oath, the NGO also
seemed to be trying to legitimize its own discourse and practice of
secularism, assuming the state to be an impartial authority that
operates in the interests of all. The organization appeared to make
a distinction between the normative state and the empirical state. In
principle, the state protects and promotes the rights of all communities
since it enshrined such rights in the constitution, but in practice it
has failed to do so. The agents of the state, including the police
and the administrative machinery, have fallen short of fulfilling their
duty. In fact, this distinction between the normative state and the
empirical state consistently reappears in the organization’s discourse,
and is ultimately crucial to its secularist agenda.48 Samuh does not,
at any point, question the normative state and secularism as a value
(of non-discrimination, acceptance of difference, mutual respect). It
only points out its failure in practice and, therefore, attempts to find
ways of reinventing it and expanding its meaning in its empirical
form.
It is, then, evident that inviting important local state officials to
inaugurate the tournaments was a strategic move on Samuh’s part.
By so doing, it intended to send out various messages.49 First, the
48 For an example of this discourse, see Vimukt Mahila Samuh (2002), Annual
Newsletter, Chitrakoot: Vimukt Mahila Samuh.
49 I learned about several of the messages that the NGO intended to convey from
my interview with a paralegal at Samuh, 24 August 2006, Chitrakoot.
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NGO expected that this would publicly demonstrate its engagement
with the local state. Second, it would increase media coverage of the
event. Third, it would raise the prestige of the event in the eyes of
the local rural population. In fact, in November 2005, several local
newspapers such as Dainik Jagaran did report ‘the inauguration of
Samuh’s Tremor Forum cricket tournament by the Superintendent
of Police’.50 Fourth, it would symbolically put the stamp of state
approval on the organization’s attempts to bring together different
communities and demarginalize Dalits and Muslims in public space.
Last, but not the least, the NGO hoped to publicly remind state officials
(like the superintendent of police) of their commitment to secular
principles.
The discussion on Samuh’s attempts at promoting communal
harmony would be incomplete without a reference to its focus on
mobilizing young people in its endeavours. When asked about the
NGO’s choice of working with young people, the founder-leader
observed, ‘We wanted to do something different. The youth has
positive energy. They don’t have any baggage. There is the potential,
the possibility of an open space. . . They are easy to mould, very ready to
participate, very vocal.’51 The shift in strategy from primarily ‘women-
only’ initiatives to working with young people is, then, a conscious
move on the part of the NGO. Samuh hopes to use young people as
a means of reaching out to the adult population. It believes that if
young people are exposed to secular beliefs and practices, they have
the capacity to change existing social relations, by setting a positive
example. The Tremor Forum cricket tournaments organized in 2005
had a big turnout, but only among the adolescent male participants. In
order to encourage adolescent girls to take part in the tournaments,
Samuh organized a monsoon festival under the auspices of the Tremor
Forum. Day-long cultural programmes were held in two villages.
The Conversations Forum girls were invited to travel from Banda
to Chitrakoot district to perform at the festival. Samuh hoped that
this would encourage the men and women watching the programmes
to let their daughters to step out of their homes more freely and to
participate in the activities organized by the NGO.52
50 Dainik Jagaran, 24 November 2005.
51 Interview with Samuh’s founder-leader, 18–21 September 2006, Lucknow.
52 This was also something that was mentioned during my interview with a paralegal
at Samuh, 24 August 2006, Chitrakoot.
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The Conversations Forum girls comprised a group of caste-Hindus,
Dalits, and Muslims. They were travelling out of Banda without
parental supervision, and were performing before a large gathering
of people mostly unknown to them. They sang songs of peace and
friendship. In fact, while some of the girls sang, others held up a
banner decorated with the universal faith symbol. The NGO seemed
to be trying, yet again, to make notions associated with secularism,
otherwise alien to the illiterate and semi-literate local populace,
accessible and meaningful. It seemed to expect that by getting local
actors to perform these ideals and at a monsoon festival, it was imbuing
them with locally specific nuances that the populace would be able to
relate to.53
It is important to note that not only has the NGO never made this
project—of making secularism meaningful in the everyday lives of the
local populace in Chitrakoot and Banda districts—an overt one, but
that the young people mobilized as part of Conversations Forum and
Tremor Forum have also never really perceived it as such. For the
majority of the adolescent girls, the Conversations Forum is mostly an
opportunity to get out of their home environment. It is a legitimate
space where they can explore their talents and acquire new technical
and interpersonal skills. The Forum is run mainly as a summer camp
where lessons in photography; using computers; sewing, stitching, and
knitting; and henna (mehndi) are offered along with social learning
activities such as group discussions and public speaking. Run by a
women’s NGO, the Forum provides a space that parents believe is a
socially acceptable place for their adolescent daughters to attend.54
The case of the Tremor Forum boys is no different. They claim
to be members of the Forum only because of their love of cricket.
According to them, the tournament, organized under the auspices of
the Forum, is ‘the biggest tournament of its kind in the district’, and
never before has cricket been sponsored and played at the level of the
entire district.55 While they do not perceive the Forum as an initiative
towards promoting communal harmony, the relations between the
adolescent boys from different communities are beginning to evolve,
53 I draw on my participant observation of cultural programmes organized by
Samuh, 8 and 9 August 2006, Chitrakoot.
54 The statements made here are based on (open-ended) group discussions that I
had with the adolescent girls and young women from the Conversations Forum on 26
and 27 July 2006, Banda.
55 (Open-ended) group discussion with adolescent boys associated with the Tremor
Forum, 21 August 2006, Chitrakoot.
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even if in subtle and indirect ways. They may not play cricket together
in the gullies of the village all year round, but come Tremor Forum
tournament season each year and they are back to practising for the
matches as a team. This has also had a ripple effect on the adults in
the village, since the boys have often had to convince their families
to allow them to play with boys from different caste and religious
communities.
On the whole, both the Conversations Forum and Tremor Forum
have also afforded the NGO staff with credible pretexts to engage with
the families of the young people, and to be aware of what is happening
in the different communities. Further, these initiatives have made it
possible for the NGO to gain the trust of the members of different
communities, to be in a position to influence them constructively, and
to try to diffuse communal tensions if and when they arise. While social
relations among the members of different communities may still be far
from harmonious, what is clear is that the Conversations Forum and
Tremor Forum initiatives have provided the opportunity for Samuh
to go beyond the purely reactive approach of combating communalism
(initially embodied by the phad and workshops) to a more positive and
long-term agenda of promoting secularism.
Such shifts in the NGO’s engagement may offer important cues
for scholars commenting on secularism as well as for those activists
within and outside the Indian women’s movement who are interested
in making secularism meaningful in practice. However, they also pose
critical challenges and new dilemmas for the NGO’s own staff and
leadership, and for those whom it mobilizes. Some of these challenges
and dilemmas will be discussed in the next and final section of the
paper.
Identity, human rights, and Muslim-Dalit solidarity
Over the years, identity has emerged as a crucial component of
Samuh’s activism in southern Uttar Pradesh. Identity may be loosely
defined as ‘the process by which social actors recognize themselves—
and are recognized by other actors—as part of broader groupings’.56
In trying to unpack the challenges and dilemmas that arise as a
result of the NGO’s attempts to mobilize Muslims and promote
56 D. D. Porta and M. Diani (1999). Social Movements: An Introduction, Oxford:
Blackwell, p. 85.
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communal harmony, in this section I will examine how Muslims’
identity is understood and imagined by the NGO, perceived by the
Dalits, and experienced by Muslims themselves. I also explore Muslim-
Dalit relations and issues pertaining to collective identity that arise in
this regard.
While a small percentage of Christians also inhabit the two
districts, Muslims are the only minority community with which the
NGO works. Yet, to begin with, there was no mention of ‘Muslims’
anywhere in the NGO documentation. In 2005, when I first visited
Chitrakoot and Banda, the NGO staff and leadership spoke of their
work with the ‘minority’ or alpasankhyak, not Muslims. One would
think that the choice of the term ‘minority’ is relevant in that it is
also part of the ‘secular’ discursive repertoire of the Indian state.
I was tempted to consider that this reflected Samuh’s readiness to
engage with secularism as enshrined in the Constitution. It could
also be interpreted as Samuh’s attempt to make otherwise opaque
constitutional categories and state discourse accessible to illiterate
and semi-literate rural populations, and embed these in the public
discourse and the local dialect. However, I observed that the Muslims
with whom the NGO engaged rarely referred to themselves as
‘alpasankhyak’.57 This led me to ask the NGO workers why they used
this term.
Here are two Samuh members’ observations, which are
representative of the responses I received. The first is from a paralegal
who was closely associated with the organization’s initiatives for
promoting communal harmony, the other is from the founder-leader:
Several workshops were conducted, at Samuh, on the issue of communalism.
We were told that Muslims are less in number [compared to the Hindus]. So
the term used for them was ‘minority’. Also, we know that they have been
given space in the Indian Constitution as ‘minority’. . .58
[Minority] is an administrative category. It is a constitutional term,
legitimised by the state, a proposition that has not been fulfilled. It was,
therefore, used at the time of the NGO’s entry, when the NGO started
working with Muslim women.59
References to the state and the constitution are present in both these
observations. The NGO’s understanding of the term ‘minority’ and its
57 The observations I make here are based on field notes, 8–14 August 2005.
58 Interview with a paralegal at Samuh, 24 August 2006, Chitrakoot.
59 Interview with Samuh’s founder-leader, 18–21 September 2006, Lucknow.
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use is, indeed, strongly influenced by the state’s own definition and use
of the term. The term ‘minority’ could encompass different groups—
linguistic, religious, and territorial—and, in the Indian context,
minorities on the basis of inferior caste status too. In official parlance,
however, the term is actually restricted to religious minorities. Zoya
Hasan observes that, in short, this mean ‘everyone who is not a
Hindu. . . In India, Muslims are the largest minority.’60
However, I was quite impressed by the manner in which the
NGO leader herself made this very observation (quoted above). She
explained how, initially, the NGO staff and leadership had rather
unquestioningly taken on the term ‘minority’ from the workshops that
had been conducted to expose them to the issue of communalism and
to prepare them to begin work with Muslims. She also admitted that
the NGO, consisting of activists predominantly from caste-Hindu and
Dalit backgrounds, seemed to have unconsciously identified ‘Muslims’
as the ‘other’ and that there may have been a hesitation on their part
to overtly name this ‘other’. In the words of the founder-leader:
Maybe there is also some unconscious thing to make it more neutral. If you
say ‘minority’, it could be any community which is less in number. Because
we’ve never used the word ‘Hindu’ in working with the Hindus in the past. We
never said ‘We work with Hindus’ because we were Hindus ourselves! Now,
we say ‘We work with the Muslims’ because we are not [Muslims]. It becomes
the other. We work with the ‘Muslims’. Who are ‘we’? ‘We’ are the Hindus,
is it not?61
The leader’s remarks bring to mind Dilip Menon’s argument
about ‘the censoring of the word “Muslim” in the national English-
speaking press and the use of the persistent, pernicious euphemism:
“the minority group”.62 The leader’s remarks and the argument put
forward by Menon together explain the absence of the word ‘Muslim’
from the documentation produced by the organization, and the use of
the term ‘minority’ in its place.
The staff and leadership claim that, today, however, Samuh
increasingly uses the term ‘Muslim’ in place of ‘minority’. Shifting
60 Z. Hasan (2004). ‘Social inequalities, secularism and minorities in India’s
democracy’, in Mushirul Hasan (ed.),WillSecular IndiaSurvive?, Gurgaon: ImprintOne,
p. 242.
61 Interview with Samuh’s founder-leader, 18–21 September 2006, Lucknow.
62 D. Menon (2006). ‘An inner violence: why communalism in India is about caste’,
in T. N. Srinivasan (ed.), Threats to Secularism, New Delhi: Oxford University Press,
p. 62.
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from ‘minority’ to ‘Muslim’ has been a gradual process and one that
has been far from easy. One of the paralegals at Samuh says:
Now we straightaway say ‘Muslim’. But we have had many discussions, even
fights, about this in the past one year. In our review meetings also this has
come up. Why call them ‘minority’ when Muslims are the only religious
minority in our area!63
Although they no longer refer to Muslims as ‘minority’, the NGO
staff and leadership seem to continue imagining Muslims as a
‘minority’, in the official sense of the term. Since the focus is on their
‘religious minority’ status, almost to the exclusion of other aspects
of their identity (gender, class, and so on), the NGO seems to have
failed to engage with Muslims’ everyday survival and development-
related concerns. As a women’s NGO, it might be expected to have
engaged more explicitly with Muslim women’s gender identity, but
this too seems to be more or less absent. It is only within the context
of the Conversations Forum (which brings together girls from caste-
Hindu, Dalit, and Muslim backgrounds) that some discussion of their
gender-based concerns seems to take place.
The ‘minority’ tag also seems to have clouded the NGO’s
understanding of Muslims in that there does not seem to be
any acknowledgement of heterogeneity among them. Muslims are
highly differentiated according to class, occupation, sect, caste-like
stratification, linguistic affiliation, and region. According to the
Anthropological Survey of India, over 350 regional or ethno-linguistic
Muslim groups exist in India. Most Indian Muslims are Sunni and, of
these, most are Hanafi, with some Shafi in the south. About 10 per cent
are Shia, mostly Ithna Ashari. The newly released Sachar Committee
Report on the condition of Muslims divides them into three classes:
Ashrafs (who are seen as equivalent to upper caste Hindus), Ajlafs
(along the lines of Hindu Other Backward Castes), and Arzals (similar
to Dalits).64
In neither the NGO documentation nor in my interactions with
the staff and leadership was any mention made about the specific
background of the Muslims with whom the NGO engages, even though
the specifics of the categories of people with whom they work are
63 Interview with a paralegal at Samuh, 26–28 July 2006, Banda.
64 For a detailed account of the condition of Muslims, see the official website
for the Ministry of Minority Affairs (Government of India): Government of India
(2006), ‘Social, Economic and Educational Status of the Muslim Community in India’,
<http://minorityaffairs.gov.in/sachar>, [accessed 29 September 2008].
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important for it—after all, the NGO staff and leadership have been so
particular in specifying whether they engage mainly with the Chamar
caste of Dalits. What I am alluding to is that Samuh seems to have
assumed Muslims to be a homogeneous grouping as far as its activism
is concerned.
Again, in this respect, the NGO seems to have been influenced by
the official and popular discourse. Muslims are written and talked
about as simply Muslims—the regional, caste, and occupational
markers by which they are known among themselves losing much
of their significance—in official documents, journalism, and common
conversation.65 Even though the NGO no longer refers to Muslims as
‘minority’ and has, in that sense, moved beyond the official discourse,
it does not seem to have been able to do so in terms of recognizing their
heterogeneity. This seems to indicate that even though the NGO has
acknowledged in its activism and approach the presence of communal
bias, it still has a long way to go before it can be said that it has been
able to overcome this bias fully.
While such politics of identity and labelling offers relevant insights
into the kind of problems that the NGO is faced with and is attempting
to negotiate in its engagement with Muslims, an examination of
the new dilemmas and challenges confronting the NGO must probe
beyond it. I will now discuss its employment of the human rights
discourse with respect to its engagement with Muslims, the reasons
behind it doing so, and how this has been perceived by the Dalits
with whom it has been working for many years now. Just as I had
found the term ‘Muslim’ absent and replaced by ‘minority’ in most
of the organization’s annual newsletters and reports produced after
the Gujarat riots, I discovered that terms such as ‘human being(s)’,
‘humanity’, and ‘rights’ (insan, insaniyat, and adhikar) kept appearing
and reappearing in them.66
When I remarked on this to one of the paralegals who had spent
an extended period of time in Gujarat, she said, ‘Women are human
beings. Dalit and Muslim are also human beings. After the Gujarat
riots, we just cannot not think in terms of human beings and
humanity.’67 I was not completely certain about what she meant, and I
65 For a historical analysis of discrimination against Muslims in India, refer to
Gyanendra Pandey (2005), Routine Violence: Nations, Fragments, Histories, Palo Alto:
Stanford University Press.
66 See, for instance, Vimukt Mahila Samuh (2003), Annual Report 2002–2003,
Chitrakoot: Vimukt Mahila Samuh.
67 Interview with a paralegal at Samuh, 26–28 July 2006, Banda.
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was keen to find out whether using the language of human rights was
a conscious effort and a well-thought-out strategy on the part of the
NGO. I therefore asked another Samuh paralegal (who had also been
closely associated with the initiatives launched by the organization to
promote communal harmony) to explain. This is what she had to say:
Using [the language of human rights] [manavadhikar ki bhasha] allows us to
bring together and justify our work with the Dalits and the Muslims as
towards the same objective of equality and not two separate things. . . Our
organisation’s job is to eradicate inequality [Humari sanstha ka kaam asamanta
ko mitana hai!].68
Theoretically, the rights-based approach of the NGO may be
sufficient to argue for the coming together of Dalits and Muslims. After
all, human rights language does offer the promise of universalism
as a way to underscore claims for equality (sameness) and equity
(difference).69 There are many similarities in the condition of the
Dalits and the Muslims. Many Muslims are poor like the Dalits: the
Sachar Committee Report tells us that their condition is worse than
that of the Other Backward Castes and, indeed, closer to that of the
Scheduled Castes. One news report even called Muslims ‘the new
Untouchables of India’.70 Is the marginality that the Dalits and the
Muslims share enough for them to want to join together in their
struggle to overcome it?
Samuh may claim that its work with the Dalits and the recent
inclusion of Muslims (mainly towards promoting communal harmony)
is part of a single, perfectly coherent project, but has the NGO really
been able to bring together its work with the Dalits and its more
recent attempts to promote communal harmony? Has it been able to
integrate Muslim women into the initiatives it had been running with
Dalit women? Answers to these questions are explored below. In this
regard, comments made by the senior leader are quoted at length.
The perspectives of NGO staff members and the Dalits mobilized by
the NGO also offer rich insights into these questions. I am aware
that the voices of Muslim women mobilized by the NGO would have
68 Interview with a paralegal at Samuh, 24 August 2006, Chitrakoot.
69 For a theoretical account of human rights, equity, and equality, see Naila
Kabeer (2005), ‘“Growing” citizenship from the grassroots: Nijera Kori and social
mobilisation in Bangladesh’, in Naila Kabeer (ed.), Inclusive Citizenship: Meanings and
Expressions, New Delhi: Zubaan, pp. 181–98.
70 Washington Post, 4 November 2007.
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strengthened the arguments I make here, but despite the efforts that
I made, it was difficult to gather their views on this issue.
I began by talking to women from Samuh’s self-help groups. I found
out that although the groups comprised mainly Dalit women, Muslim
women were part of some of those groups that had been set up since
2001 under the auspices of the government of India-sponsored and
World Bank-funded Swashakti scheme. The Dalit self-help group
leaders said that the Muslim women in their group did not attend
regularly, did not seem to mix enough, and did not stay for long
whenever they came for the monthly meetings.71 These observations
raise concerns about the integration of Muslim women into Samuh’s
self-help groups.
There are, of course, many village hamlets in which Muslims are
absent or are very few in number. When asked to comment on the
relations between the different communities in one such village, a
respondent observed:
In some places, where the Hindus are less than the Muslims, there have been
tensions. We are of Hindu caste [jat] and in us there is sympathy [sheelta] but
among Muslims they don’t have that kind of sympathy. You see, Muslims. . .
they murder without pity, throw bombs at us. Muslims are very orthodox
[kattarpanti]. It is Muslims who trigger such violence, isn’t it! The thing is
Muslims are a little less educated than us. They get involved in fights. This
is not a new story. This has been going on for years. . .72
The respondent’s remarks reflect the misinformation, prejudice,
and antipathy that Dalits have towards Muslims. Even as the NGO
surges ahead with its Conversations Forum and Tremor Forum
initiatives, change in the perceptions of the women the NGO has spent
many years mobilizing, and in the matrix of day-to-day relations among
Dalit and Muslim women, is yet to take place. What the respondent’s
remarks also reveal is that when it comes to Muslims, the Dalits
identify themselves as Hindus. S. Anandhi’s analysis in this regard
is especially apt. In a study on Dalits and secular politics in Madras
slums, she notes:
If the Hindus are identified as religiously broadminded, this ‘definitionbyself’
immediately implies a ‘definitionforother’ namely that the Muslims are
narrowminded and fundamentalist. In Triplicane slums, the Dalits, in
71 These observations are drawn from my focus group discussions with women from
a self-help group, 19 and 20 August 2006, a village in Chitrakoot.
72 Focus group discussion with women from a self-help group, 26 November 2005,
a village in Chitrakoot.
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identifying themselves positively as Hindus, mark out the Muslims with a
range of negative attributes.73
It is important to clarify here that anti-Muslim stereotypes held
and expressed by Dalits (in this case) and caste-Hindus are certainly
not a new development. They were part of their common wisdom
long before the rise in popularity of the Hindu nationalists from
the 1980s onwards.74 This common wisdom, imbued as it is with
communal feelings, is what I refer to as ‘communal common sense’.
By itself, it appears to be banal in nature. Hindu nationalists have
exploited it to mobilize the Dalits on the basis of a pan-Hindu identity
towards achieving their goal of setting up a ‘Hindu nation’. Their
agenda, as explained earlier, is a virulent one. Samuh’s efforts to
promote communal harmony and, more specifically, to bring together
Dalits and Muslims must be aimed constantly at transforming the
apparently banal communal common sense and defeating the more
virulent Hindu nationalist propaganda.
The way in which Samuh is trying to bring about social change, is,
then, a slow and arduous process. If caste-Hindus treat Dalits as the
‘other’, Dalits and caste-Hindus, by virtue of their common religio-
cultural background, in turn treat Muslims as their ‘other’. In a focus
group discussion with Samuh staff, one respondent observed that even
today in the event of a crisis, the Dalits and caste-Hindus would not
hesitate to align themselves in opposition to the Muslims: ‘All Hindus
will become one. No one will see Chamar/Domar [Dalit castes] even if
in normal circumstances they may be practising untouchability against
each other.’75 Even among Samuh’s staff members from caste-Hindu
and Dalit communities, prejudice and misinformation about Muslims
tends to surface at times (if rarely). This is the case despite the
exposure that they have had to Muslim customs and law and the
communal question after the Gujarat riots.76
73 S. Anandhi (1995), Contending Identities: Dalits and Secular Politics in Madras Slums,
New Delhi: Indian Social Institute, p. 41.
74 For an elaboration of the argument about how anti-Muslim stereotypes expressed
by Dalit and caste-Hindus are not a recent phenomenon, refer to Datta, Carving Blocks;
Jeffery and Jeffery (eds), Confronting Saffron Demography; and Yasmin Khan (2007), The
Great Partition: TheMaking of India andPakistan, New Haven and London: Yale University
Press.
75 Focus group discussion with Samuh staff members, 26 August 2006, Chitrakoot.
76 These observations are made on the basis of focus group discussions conducted
with Samuh staff members, 25 August 2006, Chitrakoot.
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When asked about Muslim-Dalit solidarity, the Samuh founder-
leader candidly admits:
I really don’t know. I am absolutely not willing to say that they will be brother-
brother [bhaibhai] or sister-sister [behenbehen]. . . Muslim-Dalit friendship is not
there! Ideally, one wants all marginalised groups [to feel united] but that’s
not the reality. [Dalits’ and Muslims’] needs, their identity, their politics are
so different. Culturally, they are so different. It is our desire that there be
solidarity. But I have a feeling that it’s not going to happen. . . And then those
on the margins become very competitive for the little resources that are there
in the world.77
Yet she also adds, ‘I am always an idealist. . . You’ve got to do what
your conscience tells you to do. . . it may change five people!’78 The
Samuh leader is well aware that Muslim-Dalit solidarity is still a myth.
The observations of the respondent from the self-help group and the
Samuh fieldworker, quoted above, clearly point towards this. Yet the
leader believes that the NGO must attempt to make it into reality.
Samuh is not the first organization interested in promoting Muslim-
Dalit solidarity. The philosophical underpinnings of this project can be
traced all the way back to Ambedkar and other anti-caste reformers.
Shared opposition to Brahmanism and caste was suggested as the
basis for unity among the Dalits and the Muslims. It was argued that
both ate beef, were poor, and were considered polluting by the caste-
Hindus.79
However, as the Samuh founder-leader herself observes, the
similarities in the condition of the Dalits and the Muslims tend to
result in their competing for the same set of resources from the state
and in society, rather than collaborating. It would be useful to point
out here that this is, in fact, typical of relations between a number of
marginalized groups, including the Other Backward Castes and the
Dalits, and has been commented upon by scholars of political economy
in contemporary India.80 Regardless of whether one ought or ought
not to approve, what can be taken from the NGO leader’s remarks is
77 Interview with Samuh’s founder-leader, 18–21 September 2006, Lucknow.
78 Interview with Samuh’s founder-leader, 18–21 September 2006, Lucknow.
79 For an elaboration of the philosophical underpinnings of the project to
bring about Muslim-Dalit solidarity, refer to Gail Omvedt (2005), ‘Muslim-Dalit
Relation’, Countercurrents, <http://www.countercurrents.org/dalit-omvedt220505.
htm>, [accessed 17 September 2008].
80 See, for example, Francine Frankel (2005), India’s Political Economy, 1947–2004:
The Gradual Revolution, New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
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that, in order to be able to take a position, one has to start from an
understanding of this.
The NGO leadership may understand this tension in Muslim-Dalit
relations. Nevertheless, there remains an undercurrent of tension in
its own efforts to bring together its work with the Dalits and its more
recent attempts to work with the Muslims. The term ‘Dalit’ means
amputated, stepped on, split, broken, burst, destroyed or crushed.81
One could thus imagine Muslims, also marginalized in Indian society,
as ‘Dalits’. For the NGO, as far as its activism is concerned, the term
must necessarily have to do with Chamars and with caste identity, not
religion. To quote the founder-leader:
We have a very different definition of ‘Dalit’ from others working with
Dalits. They say ‘Dalit’ is anyone who is socially, economically and politically
deprived. . . We are very clear that ‘Dalit’ has a lot to do with Chamar. If you
are a Chamar, you are a Chamar. Just because you come and say you are
feeling marginalised doesn’t make you a Dalit.82
I was, therefore, surprised when I found out that the NGO also
encouraged Muslim women to join the Dalit Mahila Samiti (Dalit
Women’s Association), the initiative it has been running with Dalit
women for some time now. The Muslim women were a minority in
the Samiti, which brought together women from Samuh’s self-help
groups.83
Muslim women were also invited to the three-day-long Dalit festival
that the NGO had organized in February 2006 to bring together
the women from the Dalit Mahila Samiti. Every woman present at
the festival had been asked to take an oath in the name of Dr B. R.
Ambedkar, touching an enlarged photograph of him. Each woman had
also been given a badge, with a photograph of the nineteenth-century
Dalit social reformers, Jyotiba and Savitribai Phule, and the caption
‘Dalit Mahila Samiti’. Among the activities that were organized at the
festival was one where the women were called onstage to burn material
items associated with the practice of untouchability on a funeral pyre,
as a symbolic subversion of the Hindu last rites ceremony.
The Muslim women at the festival could neither relate to any of this
nor were they comfortable with it. Fire is not considered sacred in Islam
81 This explanation for the meaning of the word ‘Dalit’ is drawn from Badri Narayan
(2006), Women Heroes and Dalit Assertion in North India: Culture, Identity and Politics, New
Delhi: Sage Publications.
82 Interview with Samuh’s founder-leader, 18–21 September 2006, Lucknow.
83 The observations made here are based on my field notes, 13 August 2006.
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in the way it is in institutionalized Hinduism. For the Muslim women
with whom the NGO works, their religious beliefs are non-negotiable.
It is surprising that the NGO, which claims to recognize religio-
cultural difference and create contexts for building awareness and
respect among members of different castes and religious communities,
should have failed to pay attention to the Muslim women’s religious
sensibilities. A number of Muslim women refused outright to take the
oath, while others took it but omitted to touch Ambedkar’s photograph
and all reference to him in the oath. Much of the meaning of the
attempted subversion of the Hindu last rites ceremony was also lost
on the Muslim women.
While icons and symbols may be a crucial component in the process
of constructing collective identity, Muslims do not regard Ambedkar
as their messiah in the way Dalit women do. Jyotiba and Savitribai
Phule may have done much to uplift the Dalits but they did little
for Muslims. The NGO had failed to conceive of and employ icons
and symbols that the Muslim women gathered at the festival were
comfortable with.84 Clearly, the Muslim women were misfits at the
festival. It appeared as if the NGO wanted to have them there but
that the festival itself was not intended for them but mainly for the
Dalit women it had been mobilizing prior to its engagement with the
Muslim women.
The use of symbols, oath-taking, and distribution of badges are
important for creating and reinforcing a sense of collective identity in
a group. However, the NGO seemed to be making the same mistake
that the women’s movement itself had been accused of: employing
religio-cultural symbols of the dominant group at the expense of those
in the minority. If women’s movement organizations had allegedly
used predominantly Hindu symbols and icons, Samuh seemed to
be employing symbols and icons that only the Dalit women could
find meaningful. In this sense, Muslim women continued to remain
excluded.
When asked to explain the organization’s position on the issue, this
is what the founder-leader said:
One realises that this is a stop gap arrangement. . . We’ve had several debates
in planning all this, this year. . . Which symbols to use? Trying to do this
84 The only aspect of the oath and the ceremony that the Muslim women possibly
may have found meaningful was the reference to the practice of untouchability.
Exclusion is, after all, practised among and between members of different Muslim
sects and also between Muslims and non-Muslims.
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whole thing of secular doesn’t mean that you let go of the symbols. There are
things that the [Dalit] women most closely identify with. Ambedkar is very
important. If you use a neutral symbol nobody will identify with it. And how
do you have neutral symbols when you don’t have a neutral identity! Also, the
reality [of the matter] is that there weren’t more than ten Muslim women at
the Dalit festival.85
Given the similarity in the religio-cultural background of the Dalits
and the caste-Hindus, conceptualizing a ritual means of interaction
to construct collective identity had not been as challenging as it
had now become. The founder-leader’s remarks clearly demonstrate
how Dalit and Muslim women’s separate religio-cultural identities
pose a challenge for Samuh in fashioning symbols and icons that
are meaningful to both groups. Marginality is, in this sense, not
enough to bind together Dalit and Muslim women. However, to say
that only a handful of Muslim women were present at the festival
is no justification for not paying due attention to their separate
religio-cultural identity. Valorizing ex-Untouchable women’s identity
as ‘Dalits’ and subsuming the identity of women from Muslim
communities is problematic. It is possible that there were only a
handful of Muslim women at the festival because they did not feel
a part of the Dalit Mahila Samiti to begin with.
The Samuh leader’s response to the above observations is as follows:
One has to work towards building the numbers. Maybe, later, it will be ‘Dalit
Mahila Samiti’ and ‘Muslim Mahila Samiti’ and the two groups will just
interact with each other. If we ever get there! Right now, it is just about
getting them in the same space, getting them to interact with each other.86
This statement suggests that the leader hopes that the challenge
of integrating Dalit and Muslim women in the organization’s
activism will disappear once the NGO has mobilized a significant
number of Muslims in both Banda and Chitrakoot districts. It also
makes clear that the NGO is aware of the contradictions and
complications that have arisen as a result of its engagement with
Muslims. However, its present focus is much less on resolving those
contradictions and complications than simply on mobilizing Muslims
and promoting communal harmony. In other words, the recently
formed Conversations Forum and Tremor Forum must succeed in
ensuring that Muslims’ interaction on a common platform with Dalits
85 Interview with Samuh’s founder-leader, 18–21 September 2006, Lucknow.
86 Interview with Samuh’s founder-leader, 18–21 September 2006, Lucknow.
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and caste-Hindus takes precedence over the NGO’s concern about
integrating Muslims into its initiatives with Dalit women, which have
been in existence for many years now.
Conclusion
Secularism needs to be understood as an ongoing project, one that
is—and will always be—in the process of becoming. It must also be
one that is meaningful to academics as well as the general public.
Samuh, through its attempts to address the communal question and to
mobilize Muslims, seems to follow this perspective. The NGO staff and
leadership claim that the Gujarat riots acted as a trigger for them to do
so. Prior to the riots, they had not really engaged with Muslims. They
claim that Hindu majoritarianism within the women’s movement, and
specifically in their own organization, had prevented them from doing
so. However, I have argued that the time-bound, project-based, donor-
driven activism—in which Samuh had been engaged for many years
and which, as a NGO, it had found difficult to escape—also played
a part in its not having engaged with Muslims and the communal
question earlier. The Gujarat riots did drive home the urgency of
addressing the question but it was because Samuh was financially and
organizationally in a position to take up the communal question and
to engage with Muslims that it did so from 2002 onwards.
The NGO does not overtly state that it aims at promoting communal
harmony. Secular discourse is subtly woven into the ‘constructive, non-
confrontational contexts’ that it has set up for encouraging interaction
between members of caste-Hindu, Dalit, and Muslim communities. It
recognizes that caste-, religion-, class-, and gender-based divisions
otherwise tend to keep people apart in a society where misconceptions
about one another thrive. The Conversations Forum and Tremor
Forum are two forums through which the NGO seeks to develop a
‘we’ consciousness among them. It has employed Muslims to facilitate
this process. It has also sought to use personalized forms of raising
awareness, linking hard activist language with elements from the
local culture so that the social and political messages it is trying to
convey through its activism can be easily understood and internalized
by the people living in Chitrakoot and Banda districts of southern
Uttar Pradesh. It is important to point out that, in its efforts to
promote communal harmony, it has strategically chosen to engage
with young people. Samuh’s staff and leadership claim that they are
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easy to work with and open to new ideas. They hope that, through
these young people, they will be able to reach out to and influence the
adult populations.
What deserves particular emphasis is that in its engagement with
Muslims and its efforts to address the communal question, which may
be interpreted as attempts to interrogate and activate secularism, the
NGO expands the boundaries of the concept and practice of Indian
secularism. Secularism is usually associated solely with religion in
the Indian context. In contrast, Samuh’s work on secularism includes
and addresses not only caste-Hindus and Muslims but also Dalits.
It is important to clarify here that the NGO staff and leadership
seem to make a distinction between the normative state and the
empirical state. They may challenge the empirical state and shape
their engagement with secularism differently from it. However, they
consider the normative state to be fair and just, and draw heavily
from it in order to justify their activism. They continue to employ the
language of the Constitution to sensitize the people with whom they
work and to legitimize their work on secularism, even as they expand
the boundaries of the latter in and through their practice.
Samuh’s engagement with Muslims and its efforts to address the
communal question throw up new challenges for the NGO’s staff and
leadership and the women with whom it works. The influence of the
state on the NGO’s activism is particularly telling when it comes to how
long the NGO referred to—and still continues to imagine—Muslims
as ‘the minority’. In most official documents and policies, Muslims
have been referred to as the minority, focusing specifically on their
religious minority status. I argue that this focus has clouded Samuh’s
perspective in that it has failed to recognize the heterogeneity among
Muslims, and has also failed to address those concerns that do not
have to do with their religion per se.
Further, the NGO employs human rights discourse to present
its work theoretically, with Dalits and Muslims as one and not
two separate projects, since its work with both aims at combating
inequality and exclusion. In practice, integrating the two projects
has been far more complicated. Muslims are perceived as the
‘other’ by both Dalits and caste-Hindus. The Dalit women from
Samuh’s self-help groups continue to harbour prejudiced views about
Muslims, views that Hindu nationalists have been propagating for
years. Marginality, which the Dalits and Muslims share, does not
seem sufficient to bring women from the two communities together.
Furthermore, the differences in the religio-cultural background of the
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two communities pose a challenge for the NGO itself in integrating
Muslim women in its activism with Dalit women. Including Muslim
women in forums, the main purpose of which is to highlight ex-
Untouchable women’s identity as Dalits, results in subsuming Muslim
women’s separate religio-cultural identity, and contradicts the NGO’s
own project of recognizing and accommodating difference, as it has
sought to do through initiatives such as the Conversations Forum and
Tremor Forum.
To conclude, if the secularist debate, which is caught between the
polarities of separating religion from the state and accommodating
different religions through state arbitration, remains unresolved
in the political, constitutional, and philosophical domains, Samuh’s
experiential engagement with secularism—its attempts to involve
Muslims in its activism and to address the communal question—has
thrown up new dilemmas which have remained unresolved thus far.
One is hesitant in being overtly critical of Samuh’s activism, given that
it has only recently begun working with Muslims and on the communal
question. However, its struggles, aspirations, and inconsistencies offer
rich insights on secularism in the context of the contemporary women’s
movement in India.
